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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
submits this administrative appeal, of the Parole Board’s
July13, 2021 denial of parole, to DOCC’s Parole Appeal Unit. The decision denying
parole should be vacated and a new hearing should be held for the following reasons:
I.
which Mr.

Parole was denied solely based on the underlying offenses of
was convicted, despite the Commissioners’ boiler-plate statements in

the denial that they considered “all required factors.”
2.

Under the reasoning articulated by the Commissioners, Mr.

will never be granted parole due to the underlying offenses, which constitutes illegal
substitution by the Parole Board of a sentence of life without parole contrary to the
legislative definition of permissible punishments for the offense of which Mr.
stands convicted.
3.

The parole hearing was a sham as demonstrated by the fact that

the decision was rendered immediately after the completion of the hearing without
consideration of any information elicited at the hearing.
4.

The file allegedly reviewed by the Commissioners in preparation for

the hearing apparently contains documents that were not supplied to Mr.

when

his parole packet was prepared and which have not been supplied to him in preparing
this administrative appeal despite requests from his attorney for same.
5.

full

parole because he meets the statutory requirements for release on medical parole.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
has been incarcerated for 37 years following conviction for
second degree murder, although he did not kill the victim, has expressed his remorse
over her death, from the moment it occurred, and has an exemplary record while

attempt in which Mr.

was a participant, and was the instigator and leader in a

botched escape attempt from the court in which

and Mr.

were on trial in

which a court officer was wounded, was released on parole in 2020, and deported. Mr.
, who was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for the murder

committed,

and to an additional term of 7 ½ - 15 years for the attempted murder, has been denied
parole six times.
In light of Mr.

s educational achievement while incarcerated, his

lack of any disciplinary offenses since 2013, and his scores on his COMPAS
evaluations, he is unequivocally entitled to parole. See the Appendix submitted
herewith, which documents the foregoing. Mr.

meets every requirement for

release, to no avail. His remorse over the part he played in the death of the victim and
the grief the crimes caused both her family and the court officer he wounded was
convincingly elicited by the Commissioners themselves at Mr.

s parole hearing.

As the pro forma denial of his sixth parole application, which is the subject of this
appeal, demonstrates, there is nothing more Mr.

can do to earn his freedom

because the Parole Board takes the view that the crimes for which he was sentenced
require that he die in prison. As the Commissioners wrote in the denial here under
review, Mr.

release would “so deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
2
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undermine respect for law.” If that is what keeps Mr.

in prison, the Board has in

effect resentenced him to life in prison, which is neither the sentence the legislature
established for his crimes nor what the prosecutor and court decided when they agreed
to a sentence for the court officer wounding with a substantially reduced term.
As we demonstrate below, that single-minded effective resentencing of
Mr.

to life without parole is illegal. And Mr.

, unlike virtually any other

applicant for parole serving a sentence for second degree murder, is entitled to parole,
now, because his medical condition makes the Parole Board’s statement that “your
release would be incompatible with the welfare and safety of society” so irrational as to
be an impropriety, requiring him to have a new hearing and at such hearing to be
released.
Critical to this appeal is the undisputed fact that in 2018
suffered a debilitating stroke, leaving him completely paralyzed on his left side, making
it very difficult from him to speak articulately, and preventing him from being able to
carry out such normal and essential functions as holding a telephone receiver for more
than a few minutes without its weight requiring him to drop it. He is essentially confined
to a wheelchair, unable to walk without assistance more than the few feet to his toilet.
His medical problem is so severe that he was certified by the Commissioner of
Correction in 2018 for consideration for medical parole. Since his stroke, he has lived in
the Walsh Medical Center. Since his stroke, he has been unable to participate in
rehabilitative programs in which he showed uniform success, or to plan for any
remunerative work once he is finally released. And in what can only be viewed as
irrational cruelty, Mr.

request for physical therapy to help him ambulate has been
3
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languishing in an administrative no man’s land for more than a year, while his muscles
deteriorate and he becomes progressively more debilitated. As argued below, based on
his medical condition, in connection with all the other factors which under the law the
Parole Board must consider when deciding on his parole application, failure to parole
Mr.

is arbitrary and capricious. Because Mr.

clearly cannot be a danger to

society, continuing to deny his release amounts to a resentencing to a sentence of life
without parole. This is a sentence the legislature did not provide for a person convicted
of his crimes and thus was not imposed by the sentencing court. Mr.

, who was

not sentenced even to the statutory maximum for the crime of attempted second degree
murder, and was sentenced for that crime to a reduced minimum term in a plea bargain
made with his prosecutor and approved by his sentencing judge, has more than served
his full minimum sentence, and sits in a prison hospital, unable to work, to study, or to
participate in whatever communal activities are available to the imprisoned population.
To make him live, and then to die, thusly is not merely irrational and arbitrarily, it is
insupportably cruel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Parole was denied solely based on the underlying
of Executive Law sec. 259-i[2][c]
Mr.

has been denied parole for the time solely because of the

“serious instant offenses” and his history of criminal conduct that preceded his
sentencing. The Board so states explicitly in its denial of parole: It says that it has
considered his institutional adjustment, his risk and needs assessment, his “positive
programming”, his “improved disciplinary record”, his age and medical condition, and
4
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accepts that all these factors support his release. For the convenience of reviewers on
this appeal, we attach in the Appendix analyses from the records of the Board and of
DOCCS of Mr.

exemplary work and educational history while in custody, until his

stroke incapacitated him; of his disciplinary record – or rather his lack of any disciplinary
record for the past eight years – and his COMPAS scores. But according to the
Commissioners in their denial of parole, “none of which outweighs the gravity of your
actions and serious and senseless loss of life and severe injuries you caused to your
many victims, their families and community at large.”
To deny parole solely based on the seriousness of the offense is illegal.
Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 AD3d 22 (1st Dept 2016),
Matter of Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD3d 707 (2nd Dept.. 2014), Matter of Menard v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 2019 WL 1115731 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Mar. 11, 2019). As the
Rossakis court wrote, the Board is required to give “fair consideration” to a parole
applicant’s “institutional achievements and remorse”; “The Board may not deny parole
based solely on the seriousness of the offense.” Rossakis, supra, at 27. Merely
summarily listing the applicant’s accomplishments while being incarcerated, and noting
the applicant’s lack of COMPAS issues other than the offense itself, is not the weighing
that the Executive Law and the relevant regulations require. Phrased somewhat
differently, where the Board “Summarily list[s] petitioner’s institutional achievements and
then denie[s] parole with no further analysis of them, the Board violates the statutory
requirement that the reasons for denial not be conclusory.” Rossakis, supra at 28; see
generally Robinson v. Stanford, Supreme Court Duchess County index no. 2392/2018,

5
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Mar. 13, 2019 (where the denial of release contradicts low COMPAS risk factors, the
Board must provide “an individualized reason for such departure.”)
In the instant case, the Commissioners failed to give fair consideration not
only to the institutional achievements and demonstrated remorse that were so
significant to the grant of relief in Rossakis and the other cases cited above, they failed
completely to recognize the significance of Mr.

stroke. That medical event bears

on both the total absence of any future threat to the community posed by his release,
and the denial of any opportunity since the stroke for Mr.

to continue to

demonstrate institutional achievements. In sum, his continued imprisonment epitomizes
the parole applicant who remains incarcerated solely because of the backward look at
his offense, and not the forward look required by the law.
POINT II
Denial of parole on the grounds articulated in the
Decision on appeal amounts to resentencing by the
Board, contrary to the Legislative definition of the
appropriate sentence for Mr.
’ crime and contrary
to the actual sentence imposed by the Court
Mr.

was indicted for murder in the second degree of a young

woman, and was then also indicted for attempted murder of a court officer. Upon
conviction for second degree murder, he was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of 25 years to life. Upon conviction of attempted murder, to which he pled guilty, he was
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 7 ½ - 15 years, to be served consecutively.
Murder in the second degree is a Class A-1 felony. Penal Law section
125.25. Upon conviction of that crime, the minimum indeterminate sentence is 15 years
to life, and the maximum is 25 years to life. Penal Law section 70.00(3)(a)(1).
Mr.

was given the maximum. But he was given an indeterminate sentence, as
6
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the Legislature requires. Penal Law section 70.00(1). The Legislature knows full well
how to sentence a person convicted of second degree murder to life without parole,
because it has done so in Penal Law section 70.00(5). A defendant convicted of
intentionally causing the death of a person under the age of 14 during the committing of
rape or sexual assault of the victim, or committing incest with the victim, is denied an
indeterminate sentence; such a defendant is sentenced to life without parole.
Attempted murder in the second degree is a Class B felony. Penal Law
section 125.25. Upon conviction of that crime, the maximum term of an indeterminate
sentence is 25 years. Penal Law section 70.00(2)(b).

was given a substantially

lesser sentence; he was sentenced to 7 ½ - 15 years.1 Thus, to deny him parole based
on precisely the events which were known to the sentencing court and to the
prosecuting attorney when the plea bargain was agreed, and which necessarily were
considered by them when a sentence was imposed for the B felony substantially less
than the statutory maximum, is to usurp the roles of the court and the prosecutor. Had
they been of the view that Mr.

should never be paroled, regardless of his

achievements in prison and his medical inability to pose any danger to society, the
prosecutor and the court could have required that Mr.

serve nearly a decade

more time before becoming parole eligible. They did not.

1

Penal Law section 70.00(2)(b) presently sets the longest minimum indeterminate sentence for a felony
other than a felony in the A range at one-third of the maximum indeterminate sentence actually imposed.
Counsel has been unable to ascertain whether the minimum indeterminate sentence which could legally
-third rule; if so he would have become
parole eligible in 2015, after service the 25 year minimum indeterminate sentence for second degree
murder, and the 5 year minimum indeterminate sentence to which he was sentenced for attempted
second degree murder. As his first parole hearing was held in 2015, he was accorded the reduced
minimum and therefore was not denied consideration due to the initial sentence.
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fifth time solely because of the “serious instant offenses” and his history of criminal
conduct that preceded his sentencing. All that prior history of criminal behavior, all the
facts of the crimes for which Mr.

remains incarcerated, were known to the

sentencing court at the time of sentencing, as is demonstrated from the Criminal History
contained in the parole packet. Under the reasoning expressed by the Board, nothing
Mr.

has done since his crimes, nothing he can do in the future, can “outweigh” his

crimes. The Board has substituted a sentence of life without parole for the statutory
sentences actually imposed, and the prosecutorial and judicial reduction of the sentence
as specifically authorized by statute.
The courts have long recognized that where the Board substitutes a
determinate sentence of life without parole for the indeterminate sentence required by
the Legislature and implemented by the sentencing court, the applicant for parole has
been denied his right to be considered for release. As the First Department wrote
nearly three decades ago, “The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner
according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for
murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory
factors, he should be released. King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st
Dept. 1994). For a recent example of the same doctrine, see Ely v. Board of Parole,
Supreme Court New York County, Jan. 20, 2017, index no. 100407/2016 (the Board’s
recitation of all the positive factors “indicate that respondent’s denial of release was
more in the nature of a re-sentencing, and that no amount of evidence of rehabilitation
would have outweighed its interest in retribution.”)
8
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POINT III
The Parole hearing was a sham
The hearing transcript takes up 19 pages of typing. Three significant
points are established during the Commissioners’ questioning of Mr.
•

In an extensive colloquy, Mr.
makes it clear to
the Commissioners that his co-defendant and not he,
killed the victim. While one Commissioner accuses
of having “tied the cord around her neck”,
Mr.
Mr.
immediately corrects him: “No. They said I
tied her hands up and then went and put the stolen
property in the car.2 When I came back he was – had
the cord around her neck. I said, ‘what are you
doing?’ And I went after him and he stepped back
and pulled the gun. And then I stopped, I said, ‘Look,
I’m out. That’s it. I’m Out.’”

•

Mr.
makes it clear that even at the time of the
robbery, he regretted that his co-defendant insisted
on killing the victim, and that he would have stopped
him had he been able to: Mr.
elucidates to the
Commissioners his role: he was holding her, his codefendant was “ransacking” the apartment and
packed the loot in a bag which Mr.
put in the
car. When he came back from the car, he saw the
co-defendant with the cord around her throat, and the
co-defendant said “I have to kill her.” She said
“Please, don’t kill me”, but the co-defendant had

:

her; “if he wouldn’t have pulled a gun, I would have
knocked him out or something and me and him would
have fought and she would have stayed alive…”
He continues to document his remorse: “…and I wish
that they will forgive me in their heart because at the
time I was young and I was foolish and I wanted to go
home and, you know, I made a mistake.” ….and
deeply apologize to them, and I would like to tell them
I apologize.”. “And I think about
and I

2
The transcript reads “and then he went and put the stolen property in the car. The transcript is
apparently in error, since the very next phrase is “when I came back …”
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said – and I just pray. I said, “God forgive me what I
did because I was wrong.””.
•

confirms that it was his co-defendant who
Mr.
pulled out an ammonia bottle and squirted it in the
face of a court officer, precipitating the incident in
which both the court officer and Mr.
were shot.;

Then, summing up the hearing, Commissioner Davis states that while Mr.
had a stroke and had borderline intelligence and brain damage, “Also considered,
sir, is to your total disregard of life here in both of these victims, a young lady strangled
and also these officials inside of a courthouse.”
From this brief synopsis, it becomes apparent that the Commissioners
knew, by the end of the hearing, that Mr.

didn’t strangle the victim, that he would

have tried to prevent the killing had he not been in fear for his own life, that he was and
remains remorseful, and that he was not the instigator of the courthouse incident. But
they just didn’t care. A hearing that purports to inquire into facts but then ignores the
facts elicited is not a hearing, it is a sham. For here, the Commissioners elicited a
substantial amount of information that both confirmed that there are no contraindications to release other than the seriousness of the crimes for which Mr.
jailed, and established that Mr.

is

was not the strangler, and according to his

recollection he would have tried to prevent the strangulation but for his co-defendant’s
display of a weapon. Thus, one need not speculate whether the Commissioners
considered all 8 statutory factors; it is evident they had information before them that
eliminated denial on any ground other than the underlying crimes. As stated in the
decision, the denial of parole was based completely on “your serious instant offenses”
which “represent a continuation of violent conduct against others as well as larcenist
10
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behavior.” ; By the completion of the hearing, the Commissioners had actual knowledge
is in all respects eligible for immediate release, but because of the

that Mr.

seriousness of his indicted offense such eligibility is, to this panel, irrelevant. It is just
not correct that the Commissioners considered “all required factors in the file.” The
panel simply didn’t consider any “required factors” that it itself had elicited. Given all
that is in the file, and all that the Commissioners elicited at the hearing, discretionary
release “at this time” is either required by law or Mr.

will die in prison. Nothing

that he can say or do, nothing that can be learned, no more intensive inquiry or
consideration will make any difference. What Mr.

did, his role in the crimes, is

fully known, and will not change.
That the hearing was a sham is established not just by the language of the
decision, but by its timing. This hearing took place on July 13, 2021. The hearing ends
with the words, “Sir, you take care. We will let you know in a few days.” But then,
uniquely as far as counsel can determine from reported decisions, while the panel is still
sitting together, without consideration of any draft decision or any reflection on what Mr.
had said, one Commissioner – we do not know who – dictated to the court
reporter the decision. While the reporter opines that the panel engaged in “due
deliberation”, she did not record any such occurrence. And the decision, as
demonstrated throughout this brief, simply mouths the statutory factors and finds “more
compelling” his instant offenses and history of criminal conduct “that dates back to your
juvenile career.” Whichever Commissioner dictated the decision was cognizant of
factual items from the parole file, such as Mr.

“improved disciplinary record since

2013”, but not a word of what had been said at the hearing itself. This decision was a
11
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“foregone conclusion”, and just as to this panel nothing Mr.
can earn him release, nothing that Mr.

has done or can do

said to this panel made or could have

made any difference. Because the denial was pre-determined, Mr.

is entitled to a

new full hearing before a panel that will actually listen and weigh. See Johnson v.
Board of Parole, 65 AD3d 838 (4th Dept. 2009), and Morris v. N.Y. State Dept. of
Corrections & Comm. Supervision, 65 Misc. 3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Columbia Co. 2013)
POINT IV
The Board has failed to provide Mr.
and his
counsel with the full parole packet prepared and
considered by the Board
Counsel to Mr.
Mr.

has requested: decisions from the first three of

parole denials’; transcripts of all prior Parole Board interviews; all prior parole

board reports and any Commissioners’ worksheets; any letters from defense counsel,
from the sentencing court judge, and/or from the district attorney; any letters and
statement from victims or victims’ representatives; any letters constituting alleged
“community opposition”; and sentencing minutes. In addition as previously provided
records provided included in a number of places redactions, which it was stated was
based on the FOIL statute or the Personal Privacy Protection Law and counsel
requested unredacted pages. None of these documents have been provided, and the
Board has not even responded to counsel’s letter.
Access to these documents is a right provided by 9 NYCRR 8008.5 and
DOCCS Directive #2014, issue date June 2019. The Board cannot simply fail to
provide these documents through whimsy or neglect. Whatever has been considered
by the Board, unless a particular document falls within the exceptions listed in 9
NYCRR(c)(2)(a)(b), must be provided to the applicant.
12
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POINT V
should be reconsidered
At the new hearing, Mr.
for full parole because he meets the statutory
requirements for release on medical parole
Mr.

also must be granted parole by the Board because he meets all

the requirements for parole under Executive Law sec. 259-s.
Mr.

applied for medical parole in 2018, after he had suffered a

debilitating stroke which left him paralyzed on his left side. Under the medical parole
statute, an incarcerated person is only eligible for consideration for medical parole if the
Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (the
“Commissioner”), after an “investigation” by an appropriately licensed physician,
certified to the Parole Board that the applicant “is suffering from [a debilitating]
condition, disease or syndrome and that the inmate is so debilitated or incapacitated as
to create a reasonable probability that he or she is physically or cognitively incapable of
presenting any danger to society.” Executive Law sec. 259-s[2][b].
The Commissioner must have so certified Mr.

after his stroke,

because the Board held an interview for medical parole on October 9, 2018.3 He was
denied medical parole November 19, 2018 for only two reasons: “given your course of
conduct in the community wherein you created multiple victims, release at this time
would so deprecate your offence as to undermine respect for the law.” and “In addition,

3

Although the Board has failed to provide counsel with a transcript of the interview, or any documents
which may have been considered by the Board at that interview, despite counsel having requested all
such transcripts and documents by letter of October 26, 2021, Mr.
right to a new hearing because
of his eligibility for medical parole, for the reasons set forth in the text, does not depend on his receipt of
the transcript and documents now; it will suffice for the transcript and documents to be provided prior to a
new hearing.

13
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this panel believes that discretionary release at this time would not be compatible with
the welfare of the community.”4
The Board did not then, and does not now, purport to second guess the

any “danger to society”. Rather, the Board denied medical parole in 2018, and
discretionary parole in 2021, by paraphrasing the words of the relevant statutes, that
release is incompatible with the welfare of society and will deprecate the seriousness of
the crime.
The words of the Board in 2018 establish that what kept Mr.

in

Prison in 2018, and what keeps him in prison now, is solely the Board’s opinion that his
crime disables him from parole, period. We have already demonstrated that based
upon the eight statutory factors for release under the discretionary parole statute,
Executive law sec. 259-i, Mr.

is entitled to a new hearing. The analogous

provision of the medical parole statute, which contains a somewhat different list of eight
factors, requires the Board to take into account the incarcerated persons age, the
nature of his medical condition, and the extent of medical treatment or care he will
require as a result of that condition. The “primary factor” for parole release is “an
overarching consideration of the petitioner’s medical condition.” Levea v. Stanford,
Sup.Ct. Duchess Co. August 12, 2020, Index No. 51558/20.
As Commissioner Coppola noted, because of his medical condition
Mr.

presents no risk of absconding; “I don’t think you’re going to be able to run

away anywhere.” In sum, Mr.

4

medical condition makes him, even more than

A copy of the denial of November 19, 2018, is attached as Exhibit A.
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others who committed serious crimes but made excellent institutional adjustment,
entitled to immediate parole.
CONCLUSION
committed serious crimes 37 years ago. He has served well
more than the minimum sentences he received for those crimes. Having done so, he
can only be denied parole under the law if there is something about his actions or
inactions over the past 37 years since his sentencing to justify denying him release.
There is nothing. He has been resentenced by the Board to life in prison. And this
despite his suffering a debilitating stroke rendering him incapable of further work, and
removing all fear of danger to society from his release. He is entitled to another hearing
and at that hearing to be granted parole.
Dated: New York, New York
January 28, 2022

Rayner Rowe LLP
/s/ Daniel Rayner
Attn: Daniel Rayner, Esq.
40 Fulton Street, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10038
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This appendix addresses the following areas:
1.

Mr.

s significant improvement and excellent disciplinary record;

2.

Mr.

s chronological and excellent work history since incarceration; and

3.

Mr.

s educational achievements since his incarceration.

It is important to note that since Mr.
s stroke in 2018, that paralyzed the left side
of his body confining him to a wheelchair, he has been in the prison’s medical unit and
unable to participate in any educational or work-related projects.
1.

Excellent and Improved Disciplinary Record.

As can be seen from the list of Mr.
s disciplinary record outlined below, he has
not been written up for any disciplinary action since 2013 and none of his disciplinary
record since incarceration related to any violent conduct whatsoever.
09-09-1986 Tier II: Disruption during work program
02-15-1994 Tier II: Solicit/wrote letter to CO
06-24-1994 Tier II: Refusing direct order during work program
06-06-1996 Tier II: Refusing direct order during work program
11-05-1996 Tier II: Contraband items (books, outdated medicine)
02-04-1997 Tier II: Refusing direct order during work program
12-09-1998 Tier II: Refusing direct order (standing outside yellow line in rec area)
04-21-1999 Tier II: Fight with another inmate
07-19-2000 Tier II: Found contraband, excessive state property, altered items (gloves,
soap, magazines, electric cord, headphone jacks, plastic bags, screws, light,
eyeglasses, cassette tapes, headphones, books, pillow, bags, radio, mirror
07-18-2002 Tier II: Lewd act (exposing himself to an officer)
08-18-2004 Tier II: Contraband (hot pot and headphones)
09-19-2004 Tier III: Lewd act (masturbating)
03-22-2007 Tier II: Refusing direct order (did not follow order to lock in)
06-22-2007 Tier II: Refusing direct order (refused to move a fan while working as a
porter)
07-22-2007 Tier II: Refusing direct order (went to showers when instructed to return to
housing)
07-19-2008 Tier II: Found altered item in cell (state pen)
07-25-2008 Tier II: Found altered item in cell (headphone jack)
04-15-2009 Tier II: Found excessive state property in cell (towels, pillowcases, sheets)
04-20-2009 Tier II: Contraband (hot pot)
06-01-2009 Tier II: Exchange of Personal Identification Number
09-30-2009 Tier III: Lewd conduct in the recreation area (touching oneself)
12-01-2009 Tier III: Did not comply with instructions from CO to provide a urine sample
07-25-2011 Tier II: Confiscated contraband (radio)
16
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03-15-2012 Tier II: Disorderly conduct with another inmate
11-02-2013 Tier III: Lewd conduct (exposed himself in front of a CO and then made an
inappropriate comment)
2.

Work History.

Since his incarceration in 1985, Mr.
outlined below:

has had a long and successful work history

(2002):
Assisted in teaching and supporting students
(2003 - 2006):
Worked in kitchen
(2006)
Helped with painting housing
(2010-2015):
Offset Plate Maker, Dark room helper, Cutting machine operator at Print Shop (2010 2015): Worked with camera operation, dark room, plate maker, desktop publisher
(2015 - 2018):
Furniture Sander: worked in the sanding pit to sand and paint spray furniture, sealed
wood, and performed other shop tasks.
3.
Mr.

Educational Achievements.
s educational achievements since incarceration are set out below.

Stormville School Pre-GED (January 1987)
High School Equivalency Diploma (October 1987)
Green Haven’s Writers Workshop (November 1987)
Industrial Safety Training Course (June 1992)
AIDS/HIV Prevention Education (September 1992)
Sullivan Correctional Facility Sign Language Course 50 hours (August 1994)
IPA Training (January 1997)
During his time in prison,
engaged in rehabilitative programs to gain tools to learn
how to express himself and communicate, despite his learning disabilities and speech
impediment which previously made talking very challenging.
credits Alternative to
Violence for first helping him begin to open up, changing from a person who used to
“hold everything in.” Through continued participation in programs like Aggression
Replacement Training, Thinking for Change, and Alcoholics Anonymous, he has
learned cognitive strategies for managing difficult experiences instead of turning to
substance use or violence.
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